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READING THE LEGAL PROCESS 
Anthony J. Sebok* 
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW. By Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks. 
Edited by William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey. New 
York: Foundation Press. 1994. Pp. cxxxix, 1387. $49.95. 
' 
I. DEFINING THE LEGAL PROCESS 
I saw my first copy of The Legal Process during law school when 
a professor lent me his dogeared photocopy of Henry Hartl and 
Albert Sacks's2 manuscript. Even though !knew that the manu-
script had been copied freely for many years, and that hundreds, 
maybe thousands, of versions sat in offices and libraries around the 
world, I still experienced a slight thrill as I held a copy of the fa-
mous book that never became a book - as if I had in my hands a 
samizdat or an artifact. Now that Foundation Press has "officially" 
published The Legal Process thirty-six years after Hart and Sacks 
last edited it, it is worth asking whether the act of publication 
changes the meaning of The Legal Process in any way. 
There is great irony in thinking of The Legal Process as a 
samizdat. The Legal Process was never suppressed, and as William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey suggest in their elegant and 
thoughtful introduction, the reasons for the failure to publish are 
most likely prosaic.3 Furthermore, while samizdats may become in-
fluential through subversion, The Legal Process exercised its influ-
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1984, Cornell; M.Phil. 1986, Oxford; 
J.D. 1991, Yale; Ph.D. 1993, Princeton. - Ed. I am grateful to the Seton Hall University 
School of Law legal theory workshop for the opportunity to present some of the ideas con-
tained in this essay. I would like to thank Jill Fisch, John Goldberg, Bill Reynolds, Ed Rubin, 
and Spencer Weber Waller for their comments and suggestions. Thomas Uhl, Brooklyn Law 
School Class of 1996, provided invaluable assistance in research and editing. 
1. Late Dane·Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
2. Late Dean and Dane Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
3. Eskridge and Frickey suggest that Hart and Sacks never delivered a manuscript to 
Foundation Press, despite a contract for publication signed in 1956, because of delays caused 
by ill health, Hart's perfectionism, and then, after Hart's death in 1969, Sacks's decanal duties 
at Harvard. An additional reason suggested by Eskridge and Frickey, and one that I believe 
carries great significance, is that by 1958 the Warren Court had begun to push public law in a 
direction that simply did not fit easily into the argument of The Legal Process. Pp. xcvii-xcix. 
See also infra note 67. · 
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ence as a pillar, if not the pillar, of the established legal community 
throughout the late 1950s and 1960s.4 The extraordinary influence 
of The Legal Process in both practice and the academy probably 
resulted from the fact that Hart and Sacks addressed themselves 
directly to students, and not to a more self-selecting audience in the 
law reviews. The Legal Process formed the foundation of a course 
taught at Harvard for thirty years, as well as at many other law 
schools that Hart and Sacks's friends, admirers, former colleagues, 
and students populated (pp. ci-civ). It is important to realize that 
Hart and Sacks could reach students who would not only become 
the legal scholars of the future, but also partners in law firms, 
elected and unelected members of government, and judges.s One 
might even think that, unlike the authors of samizdats, who cannot 
publish because of censorship and other threats, Hart and Sacks 
never published The Legal Process because, given its success, they 
did not really need to. 
There is a bit more truth in comparing The Legal Process to an 
artifact. Like a reconstructed object from an archaeological dig, 
one might wonder what the 1958 edition of The Legal Process lacks, 
and what additions would be necessary to complete it. Despite Es-
kridge and Frickey's careful explanation of the evolution of The 
Legal Process - tracing its descent from Lloyd Garrison and Wil-
lard Hurst's materials for their course "Law and Society" in the late 
1930s, to Hart, Abe Feller, and Walter Gellhom's materials for a 
course on legislation in the early 1940s, to Hart's postwar materials 
for his legislation course, to the four versions of the book produced 
by Hart and Sacks between 1955 and 1958 - there is no way to 
know how the book would have ultimately looked had it been al-
lowed to continue to evolve. On the one hand, then, to ask whether 
the book was ever finished is a trivial question; the authors them-
selves in word and deed declared it to be unfinished.6 They never 
4. The Legal Process "provided the name, the agenda, and much of the analytical struc-
ture for a generation of legal thought-the 'legal process school.'" P. Iii. See Gu1Do CALA· 
BRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 249 n.20 {1982); NEIL DUXBURY, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, ch. 4 (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANS. 
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 253-58 {1992); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: 
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, 270-71 {1983); G. EDWARD 
WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 144-63 (1978); Clark Byse, Fifty Years of 
Legal Education, 71 IowA L. REv. 1063, 1076-77 (1986); Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholar-
ship on Judicial Decision Making, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 412, 415-17 {1983); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 962 (1989) (book review); J.D. Hyman, 
Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 
1286 n.70 (1976) {book review). 
5. For example, as Eskridge and Frickey note, five members of the current Supreme 
Court - Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer - had used The Legal Pro-
cess at Harvard Law School. See p. cxxv. 
6. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 
HARV. L. REv. 2031, 2031 (1994). 
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sent the book to its publisher, and they called it- and, presumably, 
thought it important that others do so too - a "tentative edition." 
In setting out to themselves their own map of the book, they re-
peatedly included in the table of contents chapters that had not yet 
been written.7 
On the other hand, as with other texts, other factors may over-
whelm the intentions of the original authors, even on matters as 
critical as content and closure. Thus, on a very nontrivial level The 
Legal Process is a completed text. This is not because Foundation 
Press put it between hard covers, but because over the past thirty-
six years the 1958 tentative edition has acquired a canonical status 
in the relevant interpretive communities. By the 1970s lawyers 
were treating The Legal Process as not only an influential set of 
teaching materials, but as the foundational text of the legal theory 
known as "legal process." Regardless of whether Hart and Sacks 
intended it to serve as an exposition and defense of a legal theory, 
that is precisely how The Legal Process is now viewed, and, in a 
very real sense, that is precisely what The Legal Process now is. 
The Legal Process, in its artifactual form, now states Hart and 
Sacks's legal theory, from which scholars have drawn three themes 
in legal process. 
The first theme emphasizes that legal process theory grapples 
with institutional competence.8 This perspective stresses that Hart 
and Sacks "believed that it was possible to distinguish legitimate 
and illegitimate exercises of official power while simultaneously 
transcending the centuries-old debate between ... the 'is' and the 
'ought'."9 The Legal Process demonstrated that lawyers did not 
have to engage in substantive moral or political reasoning, since 
7. See p. lxxxix (Table 2). 
8. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, 
254 (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, 222 (1986); GARY 
MlNDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMEN'I'S: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 
33-36 (1995); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional 
Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 935, 943-44 {1994); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in 
Tort 61 CORNELL L. REv. 901 {1982); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Norms in Products 
Litigation: Liability for Allergic Reactions, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 761, 767-69 (1990); Harold A. 
McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New 
Legal Process, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 83, 90-91 (1989); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and 
the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2231, 2240 
(1993); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988) [here-
inafter Peller, Neutral Principles]; Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the 
Harvard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CoNST. COMMENT. 463, 479-80 
{1994-95); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Pro-
cess, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 {1983); Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process 
Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 413, 429-38 (1987); Akhil R. Amar, 
Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691-92 {1989) (book review); Joseph W. Singer, Legal 
Realism Now, 16 CAL. L. REV. 465, 505-07 (1988) {book review). 
9. Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 569; see also Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of 
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1183-85 (1985) [hereinafter Peller, Metaphysics]. 
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"there could be a kind of natural, functional correlation between 
different kinds of disputes and different kinds of institutions, so that 
the categories of dispute could be matched up with the kinds of 
institutional procedures corresponding to them."10 Thus, by adopt-
ing the value pluralism of pragmatists like John Dewey, legal pro-
cess was able to argue - contra the realists - that the analysis of 
legal validity is not reducible to political ideology.11 
The second theme emphasizes the connection between legal 
process and the problem of statutory interpretation.12 This per-
spective stresses Hart and Sacks's interest in proving that statutes 
exemplified "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes rea-
sonably. "13 In a manner similar to the substance/procedure distinc-
tion implicit in the idea of institutional competence, Hart and 
Sacks's theory of statutory interpretation rests on the conviction 
that competing political interest groups could, if governed by the 
right sort of procedure, produce rational public policy.14 This view 
of statutes depended critically on the presumption that procedures 
existed that could identify the purposes selected by the legislature 
without actually substantively evaluating those purposes.is 
10. Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 594; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation As A Postmodern Cultural Form, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 719-20 (1991); Mark Kelman, Emerging Centrist Liberalism, 43 FLA. L. 
REV. 417, 420-21 (1991). 
11. See Peller, Neutral Principles at 583-84 (citing JoHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CUL-
TURE (1939)); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE Crus1s OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NA TURAUSM & THE PROBLEM OF v ALUE 206 (1973); Minda, supra note 8, at 34-
35. 
12. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 143-44 
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in 
the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691, 694-700 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge & 
Frickey, Legislation Scholarship]; Eskridge & Peller, supra note 10, at 718-19; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 281-83 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Politics Without Ro-
mance]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1007, 1012-13 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values]; Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of 
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1988); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The 
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 249-50 (1992); Jane S. 
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 
108 HARV. L. REv. 593, 600-01 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regula-
tory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 434-36 (1989); Wellman, supra note 8, at 450-51; Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 941-42 (1989) 
(book review). 
13. P. 1378; see Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 942. 
14. Eskridge and Frickey call this "optimistic pluralism." See Eskridge & Frickey, Legis-
lation Scholarship, supra note 12, at 695-96; Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 12, at 1014. 
15. See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 10, at 721-22. To the extent that Hart and Sacks 
actually believed that such procedures existed, critics from the left exposed their view as 
naive with the emergence of Critical Legal Studies, and the right with the emergence of 
public choice scholarship. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in 
American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 601, 666-67 (1993) [hereinafter Duxbury, 
Faith in Reason]; Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 12, at 296-97; Peller, Meta-
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The third theme emphasizes the primacy of reason in legal pro-
cess.16 This perspective stresses that legal process was "premised, 
in every instance, on the belief that those who respect and exercise 
the faculty of reason will be rewarded with the discovery of a priori 
criteria that gives sense and legitimacy to their legal activities."17 
Like many in their generation, Hart and Sacks believed that the 
standard of rationality, independent from any given context or re-
sult, could be used to judge the "soundness" of a process.1s Thus, 
The Legal Process represents a significant episode in the postwar 
liberal project associated with Robert Dahl and John Rawls.19 
This essay endorses the idea that reading The Legal Process is a 
reconstructive project in which one must treat the book as a fin-
ished whole. In that spirit, I will suggest that a fourth and some-
what different theme lies at the heart of the book. I will argue that 
the structure of The Legal Process reveals an extraordinary concern 
with the problem of adjudication and that the book adopts and de-
fends Lon Fuller's conception of adjudication. My interpretation of 
Hart and Sacks's argument is inconsistent, in varying degrees, with 
the three themes identified above, and I hope my analysis will raise 
some questions about our contemporary view of Hart and Sacks's 
understanding of their own project. 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS AND ITS 
LEGAL THEORY 
A. The Two Faces of The Legal Process 
1. The Subject of The Legal Process 
The Legal Process operates on two levels: pedagogical and ju-
risprudential. Most immediately it seeks to serve as a casebook for 
a course that had none. To serve this end, it adopts a casebook's 
structure, with appellate decisions, commentary, and illustrative se-
physics, supra note 9, at 1183-87; Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and 
the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 192-94 
(1986-87). ' 
16. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 76-77 (1995); Duxbury, Faith in Reason, 
supra note 15, at 602; WHITE, supra note 4, at 144; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 27, 34 (1994); Leslie Pickering 
Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 65, 75 
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 1769-
70 (1995). 
17. Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 605. 
18. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (1973). 
19. See, e.g., Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 648-53 (discussing ROBERT A. 
DAHL, A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); John Rawls, Outline of a Decision 
Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REv. 177 (1951)). As Duxbury notes, the identification of this 
theme reconciles, to some degree, the seemingly contradictory claim that The Legal Process 
presaged both John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust and Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights 
Seriously. Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 695-701. 
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lections from law reviews and other secondary sources. The Legal 
Process qua casebook possesses a slightly experimental format, in 
that its seven chapters revolve around fifty-five problems. The 
problems ask the student to take the role of a legal actor in a wide 
range of roles - drafting a lease, giving advice to a legislator, or, 
most often, deciding a case. Frequently Hart and Sacks follow a 
problem with an extensive discussion of how real lawyers, legisla-
tors, or judges approach the problem, and then ask a series of open-
ended questions about the conventional solutions to the problem. 
The subject of The Legal Process is the subset of valid institu-
tional decisions that involve the making or applying of law.20 Hart 
and Sacks understand that a large share of society's institutional 
decisions do not involve the creation or application of law; they 
simply have little or nothing to say about nonlegal institutional de-
cisions. 21 According to Hart and Sacks, the difference between in-
stitutional decisions that focus, in some way, on law, and other 
institutional decisions, is that institutional decisions about law are 
"general, directive, and authoritative" (p. 114). So the decisions 
taken by Citizen Smith to rent her house at price x and by Gover-
nor Jones to appoint a political ally to job y may be directive -
Smith and Jones speak "from one point of time to another" (p. 113) 
- and may be authoritative - Smith and Jones claim that their 
decisions "be entitled to observance and acceptance by all members 
of the society" (p. 114) - but they are not general. Such "specific" 
institutional decisions derive from law but they are not law: "Indi-
vidualized arrangements of this kind are almost invariably deriva-
tive. They depend for their authority upon the fact that they have 
been made in compliance with some much broader, underlying ar-
rangement" (p. 114). Conversely, as long as an institutional deci-
sion is "general, directive, and authoritative," it must involve either 
20. An institutional decision is a decision warranted by the "principle of institutional set-
tlement." P. 4. The principle of institutional settlement "expresses the judgment that deci-
sions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to 
be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly changed." P. 4. 
Although it reflects a very particular view of political theory, Hart and Sacks provide a scant 
few pages of argument for the principle of institutional settlement and then assume that its 
validity is obvious to the reader. The principle of institutional settlement clearly springs from 
Hobbes: "The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regular-
ized and peaceable methods of decision." P. 4. In Hart's notes to his "Legislation" course, 
which Eskridge and Frickey characterize as the foundation of the materials for the course 
"The Legal Process" (pp. lxxxv-lxxxvii), Hart's debt to Hobbes becomes even more pro-
nounced: " 'When questions arise which in some way or other have to be settled, people find 
a means for settling them. The alternative to war is peace; the alternative to force is law.' " 
P. lxxxiv. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968). 
21. In the first substantive section of The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks spend the first 
five pages explaining the justification of the principle of institutional settlement without men-
tioning "law" or "the courts" except as a subcategory of the social order. See p. 4. 
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the creation or application of law, whether issued by a court, an 
administrator, or even a private citizen.22 
The Legal Process, therefore, studies "general, directive, and au-
thoritative" decisionmaking at "all levels": "private, judicial, legis-
lative, administrative, and constitutional."23 Hart and Sacks offer a 
visual metaphor - "The Great Pyram~d of Legal Order" - to de-
scribe an orderly, almost geometric, relationship among these dif-
ferent techniques of legal decisionmaking.24 Thus, the technique 
that appropriately determines the legal relationship between pri-
vate citizens - such as a contract - will be different from the tech-
nique appropriate to determining the legal relationship at issue in 
an arbitration, an administrative procedure, or an appellate court 
argument. A recurrent theme in The Legal Process is the idea that 
a good lawyer should develop the judgment needed to pick the 
technique appropriate for the type of problem at hand. The book, 
thus, frequently asks the student to weigh the comparative advan-
22. This noteworthy definition of law transcends certain traditions that were familiar to 
readers in the 1950's. For example, the idea that a law must be directive, authoritative, and 
general leaves out any requirement that a law serve the sovereign. Hart and Sacks carefully 
define "authoritative" as "claiming to be entitled to observance and acceptance by all mem-
bers of society," and because their definition does not rely on the identification of a sover-
eign, it represents a break with Austinian legal positivism. P. 114 (emphasis added). See 
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 220-22 (spec. ed. 1984) 
(1832); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 89-91 (2d ed. 1994); Anthony J. Sebok, 
Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2108-09 (1995) (noting similarity be-
tween H.L.A. Hart and Sacks and Hart). Also, their definition of law does not equate law to 
predictions of what "courts do in fact." See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
REV. 457, 461 (1897). It thus represents a break with proto-realism and realism. See Holmes, 
supra; JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). Finally, their definition does 
not require that law conform to moral truth. It thus represents a break with the Neo-Scholas-
tic tradition of natural law. See, e.g., Francis E. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal 
Realism: Their Respective Contribution to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEo. 
L.J. 493 (1942). In fact, what is refreshing about Hart and Sacks's definition of law is that it is 
not court-centered. Their definition suggests that any member of society can make or apply 
law as long as they conform to the three criteria identified with the practice of "general 
directive arrangements." 
23. P. 107; see also p. 112 ("The further examination of the nature of the process of insti-
tutional decision, and of the problems involved in making and appraising the decisions in 
each of the major types of institutional processes, is the concern of these materials from this 
beginning to the end."). 
24. See pp. 286-87. The base of the pyramid consists of "billions upon billions of events 
and non-events" in which members of society make laws through private orderings, apply 
those laws by complying with contracts, leases, etc., and apply the public laws made by the 
state by complying with the criminal laws, the ta,x laws, etc. At the next level are those 
"situations in which established general arrangements are claimed to have been violated" but 
no action is taken by the unhappy party. The third level represents those cases in which the 
parties to a dispute settle their legal disagreement privately, through "agreement and formal 
release; arbitration; and the decision by private associations." The fourth level captures 
those cases that are "instituted in courts or other tribunals endowed with powers of formal 
adjudication" but that are settled. The fifth level concerns those cases that are ultimately 
never contested in court but are disposed of through a final judgment, such as a "default or 
•.. consent judgment," or a dismissal or plea of guilty. The sixth level consists of litigated 
cases in courts. Finally, the seventh level "includes all the cases which go to some reviewing 
tribunal." 
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tages of legal decisionmaking through private agreement, majority 
voting, administrative dictate, arbitration, or adjudication.ZS 
2. The Argument of The Legal Process 
A quick look at the table of contents suggests that Hart and 
Sacks designed the book as a pedagogical exercise in legal methods. 
After the introductory chapter sets out Hart and Sacks's definition 
of law, the book proceeds in an orderly fashion through the typical 
lawmaking and law-applying categories familiar to the social scien-
tist: private agreements (Chapter Two), the common law courts 
(Chapter Three), referendums and the electoral system (Chapter 
Four), the legislative process (Chapter Five), the executive branch 
and its administrative agencies (Chapter Six), and the interpreta-
tion of statutes by the courts (Chapter Seven).26 Although the vast 
majority of the problems scattered throughout the seven chapters 
involve judicial decisionmaking, one cannot conclude that The 
Legal Process only grapples with institutional decisions made by 
courts. If this were so, then Hart and Sacks would have called it 
The Judicial Process.27 It is one of their great achievements that 
they were able to take Benjamin Cardozo's insights about adjudica-
tion and apply them to law outside the courtroom. Thus, while all 
of the fifty-five problems in The Legal Process concern institutional 
decisions that involve either the creation or application of law, not 
all involve institutional decisions made by courts. 
If The Legal Process did no more than define and taxonomize 
the varieties of legal activity in society, it would still be significant 
as an early example of the influence of the Law and Society move-
ment on mainstream legal education.28 Hidden behind Hart and 
25. This list illustrates, but does not exhaust, what Hart and Sacks mean when they refer 
to the "choice among several [institutional] procedures" that society must make in order to 
take advantage of the principle of institutional settlement. P. 112. 
26. Eskridge and Frickey note that the original design of The Legal Process called for 
nine chapters. Chapter 8 would have covered "The Making and Amending of Constitutions" 
which was originally chapter 2 in the 1955 draft, and chapter 9 would have engaged "Private 
Remedies for Unlawful Official Action." Neither was written. See p. Ixxxix. In some re-
spects, Dean Harry Wellington offered a glimpse of what chapter 8 might have looked like in 
Common Law Rules. and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 
YALE LJ. 221 {1973). 
27. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921) 
(introducing "the study of judge-made law"). 
28. As a survey course in the making and application of law by various public and private 
actors, "The Legal Process" would have closely resembled LLOYD K. GARRISON & WILLARD 
HURST, LAW IN SOCIETY: A CoURSE DESIGNED FOR UNDERGRADUATES AND BEOINNINO 
LAW STUDENTS (rev. ed. 1940) (3 volumes}, materials designed for the course taught by Gar-
rison and Hurst at the University of Wisconsin. As Eskridge and Frickey note, Garrison and 
Hurst's "entire project was one of institutional structure, procedure, relationship, and, most 
of all, institutional competence (a term the authors did not use)." P. lxxii. For more about 
Hurst and the "Law and Society" movement, see Aviam Soifer, Willard Hurst, Consensus 
History, and The Growth of American Law, 20 REvraws IN AM. HIST. 124 {1992). 
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Sacks's broad view of the relationship of law and society, however, 
is a subtle twist that makes it much more normative than it would 
first appear. At first glance, the organization of the table of con-
tents suggests that Hart and Sacks intended to use the book's :fifty-
five problems to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of vari-
ous techniques of lawmaking and law-applying, leaving it to the stu-
dent to decide, for example, whether a labor dispute is best settled 
by a private agreement, arbitration, or adjudication. But Hart and 
Sacks dispense with any pretense of neutrality in their discussion of 
the solution to the problem, and through their pointed questions 
they convey to the student exactly what they think of the likely con-
sequences of each choice.29 Similarly, Hart and Sacks make no ef-
fort to hide their opinions towards their theory of lawmaking and 
law-applying at any point in the book. Although Hart and Sacks 
are explicitly not court-centered, their book is implicitly but aggres-
sively "adjudication-centered."30 In other words, the progression 
from the "judicial" to the "legal" process comes with a catch. They 
argue throughout The Legal Process that although legal deci-
sionmakers do not have to be judges, they should adopt the forms 
of adjudication in their decisionmaking processes. As I hope to 
demonstrate below, Hart and Sacks build this argument into the 
very fabric of their textbook, so that at strategic points in the book's 
structure, in selection of cases and commentary, they direct the stu-
dent towards the advantages of their preferred theory and highlight 
the weaknesses of its rivals. 
B. The Valorization of Common Law Adjudication 
1. Fuller's Theory of Adjudication 
It is important to stop for a moment to consider more carefully 
what Hart and Sacks mean by "adjudication." They note that most, 
but not all, of the application of law occurs in courts, and that for 
this reason lawyers focus on adjudication (p. 178). The first section 
of the chapter on common law provides some important clues about 
Hart and Sacks's views on adjudication. In Problem No. 10,31 Hart 
and Sacks teach the student about the deceptively simple distinc-
29. See pp. 275-77. In another example, after presenting Roscoe Pound's argument at 
some length, Hart and Sacks ask tartly, "Does Dean Pound's analysis hold water?" P. 89. 
Hart and Sacks often use such open-ended questions rhetorically throughout the book, 
although perhaps none so sarcastic as the following: "What do you think the [plaintiff rail-
road workers] thought of the intelligence of Judge Sanborn and Judge Lochren? Is this a 
healthy attitude for people in a free society to have toward their courts?" P. 1142 (discussing 
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902)). 
30. "Advancing a theory of adjudication is a central aim of The Legal Process." Well-
man, supra note 8, at 417. 
31. See p. 345 (Problem No. 10: Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Application of Law) 
(reviewing Holmes's decisions in Commonwealth v. Wright, 137 Mass. 250 (1884), and Com-
monwealth v. Sullivan, 15 N.E. 491 (Mass. 1888)). 
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tion between questions of law and questions of fact in trial. They 
clearly reject the view, which they attribute to Jerome Frank, that 
one cannot distinguish between issues of fact and law.32 Further-
more, they seem to believe that judges, who find and apply the law, 
should minimize the discretion of juries, who find the facts.33 One 
might imagine that Hart and Sacks advocate the reduction of the 
jury's role because laypeople simply are not as competent at judg-
ment-making as the educated, elite judiciary. But subsequent com-
ments by Hart and Sacks suggest that they would also disapprove of 
a judge acting like a jury .. For example, in a case in which a judge 
sits without a jury, they consider it an abdication of the judicial role 
for the judge "to state only his naked conclusion: [for example] 
that 'the defendant is guilty of driving an automobile so as unrea-
sonably to endanger life.' "34 Hart and Sacks think that the judicial 
role demands more, for unless the judge provides reasons for the 
conclusion he reaches: 
[t]he parties will have no idea of the basis of his decision; and the 
losing party, being left in the dark, may be harder to convince that the 
decision is just. And an appellate court will have trouble in reviewing 
the decision to decide whether or not it involves error, unless it re-
traces the whole process of decision de novo. Compare the difficulty 
of reviewing an arbitrator's award or an administrative order which is 
unexplained by any articulate findings or reasons. Perhaps even more 
important, other private persons will have no aid in planning future 
conduct. [p. 357] 
This statement leads into a section entitled "The Reason-For-
Being of Judicially Declared Law," which uses two problems and 
finally Lon Fuller's The Forms and Limits of Adjudication to set out 
the essential features of adjudication.35 Although the Fuller article 
32. See p. 344 (citing Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 
{1947)); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); see also p. 349. 
33. Problem No. 10 concerns jury instructions in which the defendant was accused of 
promoting a lottery. The defendant admitted that he had promoted the game described by 
the prosecution, but denied that what he had done was a lottery. Hart and Sacks ask the 
student to pick between the following jury instructions: 
(a) A request by defendant's counsel for an instruction that if the jury believed beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had set up and promoted a lottery for money, 
they should find him guilty; otherwise, not guilty; 
(b) A request by the prosecuting attorney for an instruction that if the jury believed 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had conducted a game having the follow-
ing described characteristics (specifically enumerating all of the characteristics of the 
game which the defendant had admittedly conducted) then they should find him guilty; 
otherwise not guilty. 
P. 345. Hart and Sacks express their dislike of (a) pretty clearly at p. 353. 
34. P. 356. Note that this option resembles jury instruction (a) discussed supra note 33. 
35. The first problem is based on Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 1 Gray 263 
(1854). Duncan Kennedy has called Chief Judge Shaw's decision in that case to limit the 
extent of a railroad's duty as a common carrier a classic expression of the rationality of com-
mon law adjudication. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 361. Shaw's decision - which "dis-
solved" the "sharp opposition of legislature and judicial functions" - was successful because 
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appears as just another selection for the student to read, Fuller is 
not merely just another author whose views Hart and Sacks thought 
they should present in the text for the student to consider.36 They 
cite to Fuller so frequently, and use his terminology so naturally, 
that there is good reason to believe that Hart and Sacks self-con-
sciously adopted his view of adjudication.37 Fuller began his argu-
ment by noting, like Hart and Sacks, that laws must rest "upon 
some rule, principle, or standard,"38 and, like Hart and Sacks, he 
connected the rationality of law to its being "purposive."39 Fuller, 
however, was far more systematic in organizing a conceptual pic-
ture of adjudication.4o Fuller tried to identify the conditions under 
which adjudication might occur in its ideal form, so that he could 
then determine at what point legal process ceased to be adjudica-
tive and became either a "Mixed, Parasitic, [or] Perverted Form[] 
of Adjudication."41 He thought that for a decisionmaking process 
to be adjudicative in the ideal sense, it had to possess the following 
features: (1) the process must be adversarial- "[t]he arguments of 
counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two oppos-
he confonned to the special fonn or "rationality" of adjudication. See id. Although used 
primarily to demonstrate the desirability of common law courts to make law, it also serves as 
an example of adjudication that was successful, more or less, because the decisionmaker gave 
the reasons for his decision. 
The next problem, "The Need for the Reasoned Elaboration of Precedent: The Case of 
the Faithless Fiduciary," was chosen, I suspect, because it rests on a decision that lacks the 
imagination and creativity of Norway Plains. See p. 397 (reviewing Berenson v. Nirenstein, 
326 Mass. 285 (1950)). In addition to demonstrating how common law courts make law by 
choosing between competing lines of precedent, this problem also provides an example of a 
court that failed to give adequate reasons for hs adjudicative act. 
36. As Eskridge and Frickey note, Hart and Sacks reproduce an excerpt from "[a]n un-
published paper presented by Professor Lon L. Fuller to a group of Harvard University 
faculty members on November 19, 1957." P. 397, n.* (citing the 1958 version of The Legal 
Process) [hereinafter Fuller, Manuscript]. This paper - much like The Legal Process itself 
- was famous and often cited during Fuller's lifetime, but remained unpublished for many 
years. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LoN L. FULLER 10 (1984). A later, substantially revised 
version of the essay was published posthumously. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits 
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978) [hereinafter Fuller, Forms]. 
37. See Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 633. The picture of adjudication 
attributed to Fuller in the following pages of this review bears a strong resemblance to the 
five features of adjudication that Abram Chayes attributed to the "received tradition" civil 
litigation in the 1950s and '60s. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976). 
38. P. 398 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). In their introductory section on 
"general directive arrangements," Hart and Sacks organize laws according to the degree they 
possessed the features of either a rule or a standard, and promote either a principle or a 
policy. See pp. 113, 138-43. 
39. Seep. 400 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). Hart and Sacks attempt to 
establish, at the very beginning of chapter 1, that "law is concerned essentially with the pur-
suit of purposes." Pp. 108-09. 
40. For an excellent analysis of Fuller's picture of adjudication, see SUMMERS, supra note 
36, at 90-100. · · 
41. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 381. 
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ing interpretations of it"42; (2) "the adjudicative process should nor-
mally not be initiated by the tribunal itself"43; (3) the tribunal 
should aspire to base its decisions, as much as possible, on the 
proofs and arguments presented by the parties44; ( 4) the tribunal 
must be impartial45; (5) the tribunal's decision must be retroactive 
- it may have prospective effects, but it must also have a retroac-
tive effect46; and ( 6) the tribunal "must . . . at some appropriate 
point ... give reasons for the result reached."47 
Hart and Sacks recognize that given the complexity of the defi-
nition of adjudication they adopt, adjudication is appropriate for 
only a fraction of institutional decisions. They follow Fuller by de-
claring that adjudication most effectively resolves conflicts that re-
sult from human organization by common ends or shared purpose, 
42. Id. at 383; see also SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 91. Hart and Sacks say something 
similar at 633. See also id. at 643 ("Adjudication implies ... [a] tribunal imposing a solution 
upon the parties to a dispute in the respects in which they have failed to agree ..•. The 
process is not one of mediation ... "). 
43. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 385. 
44. Id. at 388·91. Fuller well understood that this condition was more often breached 
than honored, but he was emphatic about pointing to its breach as one of the early warning 
signs of a procedure crossing the invisible line between a mixed form of adjudication and a 
perverted form. See id. at 388 ("We need to remind ourselves that if .•. the grounds for the 
decision fall completely outside the framework of the argument, making all that was dis-
cussed or proved at the hearing irrelevant - then the adjudicative process has become a 
sham .... "). Summers identifies another reason as well: "As [Fuller] saw it, 'the essence' of 
(adjudication] is to give each side a chance to know what the other is saying and to afford 
each an opportunity to refute the other." SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 92. 
45. See Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 391. Hart and Sacks say something similar and 
add a criterion: "[A]djudication implies that the deciding officers are not politically account-
able to anyone for any particular decision. They [are] subject ..• only to their own con-
sciences." P. 642. 
46. "It is not the function of courts to create new aims for society or to impose on society 
new basic directives." Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 392; see also SUMMERS, supra note 36, 
at 92. Hart and Sacks seem to be less hostile to prospective decisionmaking than Fuller. See 
pp. 600-15; but see pp. 630-40 (Problem No. 23. Advisory Opinions: The Case of Mr. Jeffer-
son's Incompleted Forward Pass). 
47. SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 92. This is one of Fuller's most difficult claims to inter-
pret, and while I tend to agree with Summers' statement, Fuller's final version of Forms is 
slightly weaker than the position attributed to Fuller by Summers. See Fuller, Forms, supra 
note 36, at 387. On the other hand, Fuller also says that "it seems clear that the fairness and 
effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned opinions [in which the tribunal states 
its reasons]." Id. at 388. 
What Fuller ultimately believed is not so important because Hart and Sacks appear to 
agree with the position Summers attributes to Fuller. They say that "it is an integral part of 
the concept of adjudication as exemplified in the conventional forms of the judicial process 
that decision is to be arrived at by reference to impersonal criteria of decision applicable in 
the same fashion in any similar case." P. 643 (emphasis added). If "by reference" means that 
the tribunal must publicly state its reasons, then Hart and Sacks adopt an even stronger 
position than Fuller on the connection between the giving of reasons and the having of rea-
sons in adjudication. It is interesting that in the version of Forms that Hart and Sacks quote 
in The Legal Process, Fuller seems to assume that the tribunal will state to the losing party 
the reason for its decision. Seep. 644. See also White, supra note 4, at 144-45; Sebok, supra 
note 22, at 2102 (on Hart and the need for the Supreme Court to explain its reasons). 
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as opposed to organization by reciprocity.48 Problems of reciproc-
ity, unlike problems of shared ends, have no rational solution and 
therefore should not be solved by adjudication but through other 
forms of institutional decisionmaking, such as negotiation (private 
lawmaking) or voting (legislation).49 There is something almost 
perverse about Hart and Sacks embracing Fuller's form of adjudica-
tion and then refusing to apply it to the vast majority of conflicts 
that arise from private orderings - after all, contract and tort dis-
putes are matters of private law. Fuller anticipated and addressed 
this problem. He argued that although creating and enforcing the 
rules of the market is a shared purpose and therefore an appropri-
ate subject of adjudication, the outcome of the market is not a 
shared purpose and therefore an inappropriate subject of adjudica-
tion.so For similar reasons, Hart and Sacks follow Fuller in conclud-
ing that if a problem involves the application of many rules and 
principles then it is "polycentric" and "require[ s] handling by the 
method either of ad hoc discretion [managerial dictate] or of nego-
tiation or of legislation."51 
48. See pp. 646-47. Fuller offered the following illustrations: 
Order (or organization) through common ends can be illustrated by the following situa-
tion: A common road gives access to two neighboring farms. A boulder rolls across this 
road, blocking it .... Joining together [the two farmers] are able to remove the obstruc-
tion. Here an association of two men makes both of them richer . 
. . • Organization by reciprocity, on the other hand, requires that the participants 
differ in their "values," that is, that they evaluate differently the same objects .... By a 
trade of [the objects], both farmers can become richer. 
P. 402 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). It is important to note that Fuller ac-
cepted that problems stemming from non-converging values - "organization by reciprocity" 
- are technically susceptible to regulation by either the market or political control. 
49. See p. 645; see also Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 363-64. 
SO. "A market is a regime of reciprocity; it presupposes and requires a divergence of 
individual objectives. Establishing the rules necessary for the functioning of such a mecha-
nism is a meaningful task for adjudication; performing the tasks of the mechanism itself is 
not." P. 402 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). It is for this reason that Hart and 
Sacks conclude that "[q]uestions arising within the regime of reciprocity with respect to what 
constitutes a satisfactory exchange are not ordinarily appropriate for adjudication." P. 646. 
This distinction between the rationality of social rules and rationality of their outcomes is 
based, in part, on Hart and Sacks's adoption of the Fullerian idea of the "fallacy of the static 
pie." Pp. 102-03. Hart and Sacks seem to be assuming, contrary to Rawls, that although 
institutional arrangements concerning the market have a rational structure, the distribution 
of goods in a society governed by a rational institutional structure is not, in itself, subject to 
rational analysis. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE 83-90 (1971); Duxbury, Faith in 
Reason, supra note 15, at 653; see also Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 404 ("The court gets 
into difficulty, not when it lays down rules about contracting, but when it attempts to write 
contracts."). 
51. P. 647; see also p. 647 ("Adjudication of disputes about managerial decisions involv-
ing the selection of a course of action for the future from among many possible courses is not 
ordinarily satisfactory, if it is feasible at all, because of the numerous variables to be taken 
into account ..•. "). Fuller, supra note 36, at 394-404; Cha yes, supra note 37, at 1289-92 (on 
the "[d]emise of the [b]ipolar [s]tructure" in modem litigation); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Par-
ticipation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. 
L. REv. 410, 424-25 (1978) (arguing that Fuller's polycentric model is partially a result of the 
parties to the dispute not being evaluated by the same criteria). 
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Fuller did not argue in "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" 
that adjudication bests other institutional decisionmaking proce-
dures from the perspective of either morality or philosophy.s2 In 
fact, as Hart and Sacks suggest, Fuller understood that adjudication 
can sometimes be less effective than other techniques at settling dis-
putes.s3 Fuller did suggest, however, that because adjudication con-
cerns itself solely with rationally resolvable disputes, it is "the 
tendency of the adjudicative process to induce voluntary acceptance 
of its results."s4 Hart and Sacks's chapter on the common law, like 
Fuller's essay, explicitly defines adjudication and then determines 
whether it should be chosen over some other method.ss Hart and 
Sacks agree with Fuller that knowing the limits of adjudication is as 
important as knowing its form.s6 
2. The Lure of False Adjudication 
At the end of Chapter Three Hart and Sacks attempt to identify 
the "kinds of disputes which lend themselves to reasoned decision" 
(p. 646). They include disputes in which the "claimant asserts a 
right to a remedy within the power of the tribunal to grant," and 
disputes in which the available remedy does not require too much 
discretion on the part of the adjudicator (p. 646). Hart and Sacks 
exclude, for example, an antitrust dispute that would require a 
judge to "reorganiz[e] the ... industry," "questions arising with the 
regime of reciprocity with respect to what constitutes a satisfactory 
exchange," and "disputes about managerial decisions involving the 
selection of a course of action for the future from among many pos-
sible courses" (pp. 646-47). In general, the resulting list shows an 
extraordinary ,bias towards disputes that arise in corhmon law.s1 
52. Fuller made these arguments in LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY oF LAW (2d ed. 
1969). 
53. See p. 645. "To the extent that the resolution of the dispute depends essentially upon 
what Professor Fuller calls the principle of order by reciprocity, as distinguished from the 
principle of order through common ends (including the maintenance of a regime of reciproc-
ity), the method of adjudication operates to eliminate the best judges of a satisfactory ex-
change'""'." namely, the parties to the exchange themselves .... " P. 645 (emphasis added). 
54. P. 400 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). 
55. Hart and Sacks reject the idea that "there are no disputes of any kind which cannot 
be effectually settled by establishing an impartial and sufficiently prestigeful tribunal to hear 
them, giving both sides or all sides of the dispute an opportunity to present their evidence 
and argument, and then having the tribunal make its decision." P. 644. 
56. This is true for two reasons. First, "[w]here adjudication is used to settle disputes not 
subject to rational decision, the moral force of the institution suffers." P. 401 (quoting Fuller, 
Manuscript, supra note 36) (emphasis added). Second, "if a dispute is not susceptible to a 
reasoned solution, then the attempt to force it into the mold of adjudication will render 
unavailable the very means which are rationally best calculated in most situations to produce 
a satisfactory settlement." P. 645. 
57. See also Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 661 ("Hart and Sacks purport to 
favor neither common law nor legislation, yet they seem to display a peculiar preference for 
the judicial decision.") (footnote excluded). 
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Hart and Sacks argue that there is a connection between the form 
of adjudication and common law. Because the "remedies available 
in the armory of the common law courts [are] few and relatively 
well defined," an adjudicator "will always be able to determine 
whether a claimant does or does not possess a right" (pp. 646-47). 
As long as law stays within the boundaries fixed by adjudication, it 
will be provided with "a comprehensive, underlying body of law 
adequate for the resolution of all the disputes that may arise within 
the social order."58 But the valorization of common law in Chapter 
Three is not simply an act of exclusion; rather it suggests that, to the 
extent that other legal techniques are susceptible to rational analy-
sis, they ought to adopt the form of adjudication. 
Fuller recognized the concept of adjudication as an ideal type, 
and that it could manifest itself in the world in greater and lesser 
degrees. It was with this skeptical attitude that he turned to newer 
"mixed" forms of adjudication such as arbitration or administrative 
law. Fuller noted that "tripartite" arbitration, which during the 
1940s and 1950s became a widely used decisionmaking procedure in 
. the emerging field of labor law,59 "tends to deteriorate ... into a 
kind of continuation of bargaining behind closed doors, or ... into 
an empty form."6° Fuller was equally skeptical about the capacity 
of administrative agencies to operate effectively while adhering to 
the adjudicative mode of decisionmaking.61 Fuller_thought that, at 
58. P. 647. Hart and Sacks's description of the "completeness of the common Jaw" is 
shared by both Christopher Langdell and Ronald Dworkin. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's 
Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 7 (1983). It is worth noting that the example Fuller uses to 
demonstrate his theory of the inherent rationality of the common law is the problem of what 
rule to apply "when the acceptance and revocation of an offer cross in the mails." P. 401 
(quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). Fuller notes that although honest minds might 
disagree over the proper solution, the choice between the modem rule - acceptance is effec-
tive upon dispatch - and its alternative is not "purely arbitrary" but "may be derived ration-
ally from the purposes shared by a commercial community." P. 401 (quoting Fuller, 
Manuscript, supra note 36). It is unclear whether Fuller, like Langdell, invokes "higher 
level" legal principles, or solves this legal problem by invoking policy. See C.C. LANGDELL, 
A SUMMARY OF TiiE LAW OF CoNTRACTS 20-21 (2d ed. 1880); Grey, supra, at 27; James 
Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private 
Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 371, 372-73 (1993) (on the tension between 
Fuller's instrumentalist tendencies in his contracts scholarship and the formalism that per-
vades his jurisprudential writings). 
59. Seep. 330 (citing Edgar L. Warren & Irving Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 
4 IND. & LAB. REL. 200, 217 (1951)). 
60. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 397. Hart and Sacks equally criticize arbitration in 
nonlabor cases. At the end of Problem No. 8 ("Private Arbitration: The Case of the Litig-
ious Investor") they examine with skepticism the argument$ in favor of voluntary arbitration. 
See, e.g., pp. 314-21 (questioning the alleged advantages stemming from private arbitration's 
speed, lack of rancor, technical expertise, privacy, freedom from precedent, and finality). 
61. Fuller suggested that polycentric problems were often given to administrative agen-
cies because "[t]he instinct for giving the affected citizen his 'day in court' pulls powerfully 
toward casting exercises of governmental power in the mold of adjudication, however inap-
propriate that mold may tum out to be." Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 400. He argued 
that certain administrative agencies, such as the War Manpower Commission, the Office of 
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a certain point, a law-like process that tries to solve a problem "not 
susceptible of a reasoned solution"62 became a perverse form of ad-
judication that survives only by drawing its "moral strength" from 
institutions of real adjudication.63 
Hart and Sacks conclude Chapter Three by focusing on the 
problem of parasitic adjudication. They refer to the "many well-
intentioned bandits [who] engage in attempted raids upon [adjudi-
cation's] prestige ... they want the benefits of judge-made law with-
out having to accept the conditions of decision which are necessary 
to secure the benefits."64 As this language suggests, Hart and Sacks 
see a double threat from public decisionmaking that falsely helps 
itself to the prestige and authority of true adjudication. They argue 
that not only can parasitic forms of adjudication deny disputants a 
process better suited to solve their problem (p. 645), but notwith-
standing the success of any individual episode of parasitic adjudica-
tion, the practice has a corrosive effect on the overall legal system. 6s 
In order to help the student identify parasitic adjudication, Hart 
and Sacks even offer an exercise in which they ask the student to 
decide whether adjudication could successfully solve any one of the 
fictional disputes they set out in a list. The list constitutes a spec-
trum that ranges from a mere award of a license to an international 
crisis.66 Hart and Sacks stress that the question is not whether these 
disputes should be solved in court, but instead whether they should 
be solved by any of the "tribunals which clothe their proceedings in 
Price Administration, and the War Production Board, could perform their functions effec-
tively and precisely because they did not attempt to "act adjudicatively," while the FCC, for 
instance, suffered from its attempt to provide an adjudicative procedure in the awarding of 
television and radio licenses, a task that Fuller thought was ultimately not susceptible to 
reasoned solution. See id. at 400-03. 
62. The phrase is Hart and Sacks's. See p. 645. 
63. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 406. 
64. P. 642 (discussing whether an institutional procedure for obtaining advisory opinions 
would qualify as adjudication). 
65. 
If society is to achieve any degree of effective order, we must leave it to the highest 
political power to make those decisions that can claim no greater rationality than that 
they respond to a felt need for some decision, right or wrong ...• [But) the judge must 
find some better justification for his decision than that they decide. 
P. 644 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). In the final version of Forms, Fuller takes 
a slightly less hostile view of parasitic forms of adjudication: "In labeling [a form of decision-
making] 'parasitic,' I intend no more condemnation than when a botanist calls a certain fun-
gus 'parasitic.' Just as, from the standpoint of human interest, there are good and bad fungi, 
so parasitic forms of order may be good or bad.'' Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 406. 
66. The examples are: choosing a recipient of a broadcast license among a set of appli-
cants, the solution of a labor dispute, the final formulation of a zoning plan, the resolution of 
a regulations dispute between the United States Treasury Department and the Federal Re-
serve Board, the resolution of a deadlock between the two Houses of Congress over the 
amending of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, and a dispute between two coun-
tries over the alleged attempts by one country to change the form of government in the other 
country. See p. 641. 
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some or all of the conventional trappings of adjudication" (p. 641). 
The distinct impression one has at the end of Chapter Three is that 
Hart and Sacks believe that none of the disputes in that list should 
be solved through adjudication, and that for that reason, they are 
hostile to an activist use of law for progressive ends.67 That view is 
partially right; however, I think it is more accurate to say that Hart 
and Sacks were less concerned ·about restricting the subject matter 
and political direction of the legal process than they were about 
insuring that important social problems were not mishandled either 
by being forced into an adjudicative process when they were not 
susceptible to rational analysis, or by being subjected to a legal pro-
cess that was insufficiently adjudicative.6s 
C. The Covert Argument for Adjudication in The Legal Process 
The Legal Process purports to survey all the techniques con-
tained in the "Great Pyramid of Legal Order," but the book's own 
structure undermines that claim. To be sure, Hart and Sacks do not 
make the mistake of assuming that only judges can adjudicate, and 
one of the wonderful features of the book is that they explore ways 
in which legal actors other than judges can bring the values of adju-
dication into their legal activity. Even so, it is interesting to look at 
where Hart and Sacks ultimately dedicate the book's energies. 
They spend 42 % of the book on just two topics: the enforcement of 
the common law by judges (Chapter Three) and the interpretation 
of statutes by judges (Chapter Seven). No other chapter except for 
the chapter on the creation of legislation (Chapter Five) receives 
similar attention.69 
Obviously, one should conclude only so much from the length of 
chapters. Yet, even this crude measure suggests that Hart and 
Sacks seem more interested in the work of judges than in work of 
other actors in the legal system. In fact, a careful review of the 
content of the seven chapters - especially the chapters on the com-
67. It is hard not to imagine that Hart and Sacks are addressing the specter of Brown v. 
Board of Education when they state that "[t]he present question is whether the enthusiasts 
for adjudication as a method of settling every kind of social problem may not be opei;i to the 
charge of trying to make a similarly parasitic use of the prestige of the method." P. 642. See 
Norman Dorsen, In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, 105 HARV. L. REv. l, 12 (1991) (contesting 
the criticism made by progressive lawyers that legal process wallowed in "conservative and 
procedural fetishism"); see also p. cxix; Vetter, supra note 4 at 417. 
68. Of course, it is very possible that Hart and Sacks's deep commitment to maintaining 
the "prestige" and "integrity" of the legal process by testing its range against the ideal of 
adjudication is inextricably linked to a politically conservative agenda. This essay will not 
take up that question. Compare Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 608 (arguing the 
connection was inevitable) with Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 667 (the connec-
tion is "exaggerated"). 
69. For example chapter 4 (on referendums and the election of lawmakers) is only 42 
pages long and chapter 6 (on the executive branch and administrative agencies) is 100 pages 
long. 
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mon law, legislation, and statutory interpretation - reveals that 
Hart and Sacks do not examine judges so much as the work of 
judges. That is, Hart and Sacks have a deep commitment to the 
idea of adjudication, an activity that, as noted above, occurs most 
frequently but not exclusively in the courtroom. Hart and Sacks 
criticize judges who, in their opinion, evade or pervert adjudication, 
and they cautiously support nonjudicial actors who, where appro-
priate, faithfully adopt the forms of adjudication. 
For example, Hart and Sacks spend an extraordinary amount of 
space criticizing Justice Black's "abdication" of judicial responsibil-
ity in Problem No. 18.70 In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & 
Refitting Corp, 71 a worker, covered by the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWA), sued and received 
judgment against Halcyon, the owner of the ship upon which the 
worker was injured. In the same action, the jury returned a special 
verdict finding Halcyon 25% responsible and the worker's em-
ployer, Haenn, 75% responsible for the injury. Halcyon then sued 
Haenn for contribution. The Court heard arguments on whether 
admiralty allows contribution as between joint tortfeasors on ac-
count of claims by third persons, and if it does, whether the LHW A 
limited Haenn's contribution to the compensation owed the worker 
under the federal statute. Justice Black, writing for the Court, held 
that "it would be unwise to fashion new judicial rules of contribu-
tion and that the solution of this problem should await congres-
sional action."72 Hart and Sacks mercilessly critique the Court's 
argument that admiralty law had not yet developed either prece-
dent or principle upon which to extend the doctrine of contribution 
from collision cases to noncollision cases.73 They argue that Hal-
cyon was not driven by its doctrinal reasoning - which Hart and 
70. See p. 496. The problem is titled "The Paradox of Making Law by Refusing to Make 
Law: The Halcyon Case." 
71. 342 U.S. 282 (1952). 
72. P. 498 (quoting Halcyon, 342 U.S. at 285). The Court reserved the question of 
whether, if Congress chose to extend the right to contribution among joint tortfeasors to 
admiralty cases, the contribution should be limited by the LHWA. Seep. 499 n.12. 
73. They conclude that: 
At one stroke the Court (1) reached an unsound conclusion in the case before it, (2) 
destroyed the harmony of the underlying maritime law in this general area, and (3) es-
tablished a precedent which puts into question the continued vitality in the federal courts 
of the whole Anglo-American tradition of growth of decisional law. 
P. 515 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, Hart and Sacks argue that by denying the common law right to contribu-
tion, the Court turned tortfeasors like Halcyon into absolute indernnitors of joint tortfeasor 
employers, because the LHWA, a form of workman's compensation, naturally allowed the 
employer to recover its payments from the employee if the employee successfully sued a 
third party like Halcyon. See pp. 508-09. It is worth noting that Hart and Sacks unfavorably 
compare Black's refusal to use the Court's earlier collision cases to solve this noncollision 
case with Shaw's application of case law to common carriers to the railroads in Norway 
Plains. See p. 501. 
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Sacks call "so much eyewash" (p. 516) - but by Justice Black's 
misunderstanding of the Court's role. Black's opinion tried to de-
termine whether Halcyon had a right to contribution by asking 
whether in this matter "the method of legislative growth of the law 
is to be preferred to the method of judicial growth." In so conclud-
ing, Black pretended that, by deferring to Congress, the Court in 
fact was not making law.74 Hart and Sacks suggest that a lack of 
respect for adjudicative values animated Black's "profoundly anti-
constitutional and indeed unconstitutional" reasoning (p. 517). 
Black supported his decision by asserting that Congress had en-
tered the sphere of maritime personal ,injury, which demonstrated 
that: 
many groups of persons with varying interests are vitally concerned 
with the proper functioning and administration of [maritime torts] ... 
[w]e think that legislative consideration and action can best bring 
about a fair accommodation of the diverse but related interests of 
these groups.75 
On the other hand, noted Black, in the case before the Court the 
only party "in favor" of allowing contribution was Halcyon.76 Hart 
and Sacks accuse Black of trivializing the interests of the parties 
and considering "the wishes" of economic interest groups not even 
before the Court.77 In fact, Hart and Sacks accuse Black of strip-
ping away from the case many of the elements that they deem cen-
tral to adjudication: by ignoring the parties in interest, the Court 
did not stand "suspended" between two advocates; the Court made 
and interpreted law but gave no reasons; and finally, instead of lim-
iting itself to the remedies available to it, the Court enthusiastically 
embraced a polycentric task.78 This, according to Hart and Sacks, 
74. Seep. 517; see also p. 515 {"There can be no doubt, can there, that the Court actually 
'fashioned new judicial rules' while asserting that it was 'unwise' and 'inappropriate' to do 
so •.. ?"). 
75. P. 498 (quoting Halcyon, 342 U.S. at 286). 
76. P. 498 (quoting Halcyon, 342 U.S. at 286). 
77. Seep. 517 ("[C]ould unconcern for the interests of the parties before the Court be 
made more explicit?"). One might think that Halcyon anticipated the modem trend towards 
expanding the set of parties of interest in public law litigation. See Chayes, supra note 37, at 
1291; Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1723-47 {1975). However, Hart and Sacks's criticism of Black's decision went beyond 
accusing him of misunderstanding adjudication. They suggest, ultimately, that Black's deci-
sion sought to insure that the worker's employer in Halcyon would have an incentive to 
advance the worker money while he sued the employer's co-tortfeasor. Thus, Halcyon - its 
language about deference to Congress notwithstanding - was really about securing a "tacti-
cal advantage ... which will predispose a negligent employer to finance the employee in the 
employee's own lawsuit so as to pass the whole buck of the loss in a polite way to the em-
ployer's co-tortfeasor." P. 521. Hart and Sacks opine that this result would have appealed to 
Black because it would make it easier for workers to sue negligent third parties like Halcyon. 
This appeal proves in the minds of Hart and Sacks the truly unprincipled and realist roots of 
the decision. See p. 521. 
78. Despite the fact that the result of the Court's process was to defer to a legislative 
body, the question that Black asked - who should decide whether there is a right to contri-
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was not a case of a nonjudicial body adopting a perverted form of 
adjudication but of a court adopting a perverted form of legislation. 
Although they do not say so explicitly, Hart and Sacks most ap-
prove of agencies when they incorporate adjudicative values. For 
example, in Problem No. 43, aptly named "Drafting an Administra-
tive Opinion: The Oil Pump Fiasco," they compare an actual Fed-
eral Trade Commission decision with an alternative model decision 
written for their book.79 Whereas the Commission issued a deci-
sion that consisted of nothing but :findings of fact, a conclusion, and 
an order, Hart and Sacks's model decision looks like a judicial opin-
ion, with sections entitled, "analysis of issues," "findings of adjudi-
cative fact," and "conclusions of law" (pp. 1084-92). Hart and 
Sacks make no attempt to hide their preference for their model de-
cision. 80 Hart and Sacks believe that the only reasonable interpre-
tation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is that it 
required the FTC to "build up a body of administrative law through 
the articulation of grounds of decision intelligible enough and well 
enough reasoned to have an impact at the stage of primary private 
activity" (p. 1103). In other words, the Commission, like a court, 
was responsible "in the determination[s] of matters of law" (p. 
1107), and, like a court, the more its procedures reflected adjudica-
tive values, the better it would do its job.s1 Hart and Sacks's as-
sumption about the centrality of adjudication in the legal process of 
bution in this case - was not "susceptible of reasoned elaboration and ... ought to be made 
by a political arm of the government," and had been already answered by Congress. P. 516. 
Hart and Sacks therefore understood Black's act of judicial passivism with regard to statutes 
as an act of judicial activism with regard to the Constitution. See, e.g., Peller, Neutral Princi-
ples, supra note 8, at 600 (stating that Hart and Sacks were "staunchly opposed" to judicial 
activism only at the level of constitutional law). 
79. See p. 1083. The decision upon which Hart and Sacks base this example, Matter of 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Docket No. 337, 2 F.T.C 357 (1920), involved Standard Oil's 
practice of leasing gasoline pumps at below cost to retail gasoline dealers on the condition 
that the pumps be used only to pump Standard Oil's gasoline. The Commission found that 
the leasing arrangement violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 and 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act of 1914. The Commission's findings were later invalidated in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 261 U.S. 463 (1923). 
80. The only secondary source they include, GERARD HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL 
TRADE CoMMISSION (1924), clearly inspired their model decision: 
It seems to me that the most important single step which the Commission could take ... 
would be to abandon the formal and legalistic "findings" to which it is now addicted, and 
to adopt instead ... signed opinions of the kind employed ... in the courts of England 
and of the United States. 
P. 1105 (quoting HENDERSON, supra, at 334). 
81. Hart and Sacks say that the FTC's standard practice failed to satisfy a number of the 
conditions for adjudication: (1) the process was not truly adversarial, since the deci-
sionmaker did not technically choose between two competing legal arguments; (2) the tribu-
nal did not, in its decision, base its decision on the proofs and arguments presented by the 
parties; (3) the decision written by the tribunal did not deal impartially with the arguments 
presented by both sides. See p. 1106 (quoting HENDERSON, supra note 80, at 334-37). 
Neither Henderson nor Hart and Sacks discuss how an administrative agency could satisfy 
the adjudicative ideal that the decisionmaker be impartial. 
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agencies is evident also in their theoretical discussion of the inter-
pretation of statutes by agencies in Chapter Seven. Hart and Sacks 
approve of Justice Robert Jackson's view that when Congress writes 
a law like the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, which for-
bade "unfair methods of competition,'' the relevant agency must, in 
interpreting the "inchoate" law, make law.82 But in doing so, the 
agency finds itself in the same position as a court interpreting an 
"avowedly indeterminate direction[ ]."83 Since Hart and Sacks min-
imize the difference between the judicial interpretation of a statute 
and legislation,84 it should not be surprising that they see little dif-
ference between adjudication by a court and by an agency: "an 
agency can formulate law in the same form and manner as a 
court."85 
So far, we have seen that Hart and Sacks privilege courtroom 
adjudication and hypothesize that greater allegiance to adjudication 
could improve the work of administrative agencies. A final piece of 
evidence of The Legal Process's commitment to the primacy of ad-
judication is Hart and Sacks's treatment of legislation in Chapter 
Five. When they find statutory interpretation wanting - and they 
often do - it is because it lacks one or more of the essential quali-
ties found in adjudication. For example, Hart and Sacks spend an 
unusual amount of space discussing the origins of the American 
Law Institute and codification movements in general - a peculiar 
decision given that Chapter Five purports to discuss legislation. 
The lesson they draw from the history of the Restatements is that 
the ALI incorrectly thought that it could usefully organize the com-
mon law into a set of rules, not principles, based on authority rather 
than reason (pp. 740-41). The Restatement project took a turn for 
the better in 1953 when the ALI "approved[] a substantial change 
in policy ... [and allowed] an 'enlarged statement of reasons' .in the 
comments" and other steps designed to show "that 'the law does 
grow by court decisions.' "86 This early section in the chapter in-
82. Pp. 1309-10 (quoting Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
83. P. 150 ("[The] broad standard [established by the Federal Trade Commission Act of 
1914] was backed up and informed by principles and policies implicit in the history and gen-
eral scheme of the statute."). 
84. See, e.g., p. 126 ("Enacted law may displace decisional law as a means of initial formu-
lation of legal arrangements, but not as a means of elaboration[, f]or enactments need to be 
interpreted .... "). 
85. Pp. 1311-12. Hart and Sacks argue for the distinctiveness between agencies and ju-
ries, and end up showing that judges and agencies share many adjudicative features: (1) both 
are "capable of formulating legal standards and rules" to guide future conduct - i.e., explain 
the reasoning; (2) both must be as "even-handed .•. as possible"; and (3) both must formu-
late the governing rules and standards in the case before them - i.e., restrict themselves to 
the arguments of the parties before them. Pp. 1311-12. 
86. Pp. 746-47 (quoting A.L.I. Proceedings from 1953 & 1954). Hart and Sacks are simi-
larly skeptical about European code systems. They argue, in effect, that in order to avoid 
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tends to make clear, from the beginning, that the real mistake made 
by those who distinguish common law and legislation is not that 
they focus on the fact that the former is announced by judges and 
the latter created by politicians, but that they think that the former 
resides in principles and that the latter in a set of rules. 87 Hart and 
Sacks challenge this idea, as evidenced by the following rhetorical 
questions: "Cannot there also be postulates of reasoning, which 
limit and control, behind the words of statutory provisions .... Can-
not a legislature effectually state its postulates and tell the courts 
that they are to treat them as lifting and controlling in their reason-
ing?"88 The rest of the chapter seeks to show that statutes should 
reflect, as much as possible, the sort of principles found in common 
law. 
In Problem No. 29 ("Revision of Judicial Interpretation of an 
Existing Statute"), Hart and Sacks use a lengthy excerpt from a 
congressional hearing to illustrate the dangers of encouraging the 
idea that a statute is all rule and no principle. The purpose of the 
hearing was to pass a relatively simple piece of legislation to reverse 
a Supreme Court decision that had held that the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not require a manufacturer to permit 
entry by a federal inspector.89 In Cardiff, the Court refused to give 
the Act what clearly was its only reasonable reading, because -
according to Hart and Sacks - the Court felt that since Congress 
had created a "mess" by writing a vague or self-defeating rule, Con-
gress should see its purposes frustrated and then amend the law 
through subsequent legislation.9° Hart and Sacks clearly think that 
had the Court treated the Act like a principle, it could have ren-
overly rigid and outdated codes, French and German lawyers, when necessary, reason from 
their codes in the same way that an English or American lawyer reasons from principles in 
the common law. See pp. 764-66 (discussing the "Recourse to Generality" in the French Civil 
Code); see also pp. 771-72 (quoting JUSTUS w. HEDEMANN, DIE FLUCHI' IN DIE GENERAL-
KLAUSELN (1933)). 
f!:/. Hart and Sacks clearly disagree with the sentiment that "a code must be dogmatic ..• 
a statute must never be either a reasoning or a dissertation." P. 781 (quoting ERNST FREUND, 
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION (1932)). 
88. P. 783. Hart and Sacks illustrate their point with an example based on Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), in which they propose three 
alternative hypothetical acts of legislation that would enforce the common law right to pri-
vacy that the New York Court of Appeals had denied erroneously, in Hart and Sacks's opin-
ion, as well as those of other courts and the New York legislature. The alternative they 
prefer "avoids the difficulties .•. [of] fragmentary codification by a level of generality that 
leaves all of [the difficulties in elaborating the principle] to be resolved by future judicial 
action." P. 783. See also Kennedy, supra note 18, at 396; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: 
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 79 n.395 (1992). 
89. See pp. 810-33 (discussing United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952)). 
90. See pp. 817-18. Hart and Sacks mockingly refer to this response to poorly framed 
legislation as the "fiagellant theory of statutory interpretation." P. 91. It is quite similar to 
the position taken by Fuller's mythical Justice Keen. See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the 
Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 616, 636-37 (1949). 
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dered it coherent through adjudication and they use the example of 
the hearing to show the unintended and unfortunate consequences 
of the Court's approach. In the relatively insignificant episode they 
document, an industry lobbyist tried to get a congressional commit-
tee to state in the legislative records that the clarification of the 
FDA's right to entry, which confirmed a previous FDA construc-
tion, should not be seen by the courts as a confirmation of other 
previous administration constructions of the same act (pp. 814-15). 
As Hart and Sacks observe, the congressmen. had backed them-
selves into a comer. By allowing the courts to treat its statute like a 
. limited rule, Congress had no alternative but to tell the courts that 
their approval of a subsequent reasonable interpretation of its act 
by the FDA did not indicate an approval of other FDA interpreta-
tions of the same statute based on the same reasoning.91 This case, 
like others in the chapter, is used by Hart and Sacks to illustrate the 
perils of viewing legislative intent as no more than a statute's au-
thor's specific intentions.92 The only cure to this problem, Hart and 
Sacks seem to say, is for courts to treat legislation like common 
law.93 
91. From the questions Hart and Sacks ask the student, it is clear that, given the premises 
upon which the statute had been drafted, the committee had failed to meet the objections 
raised by the lobbyist at the hearings. See p. 833. 
92. The first rule of statutory interpretation Hart and Sacks offer at the end of chapter 7 
says, "a court ... is to decide what meaning ought to be given to the directions of the statute 
in the respects relevant to the case before it. [This] does not say that the court's function is to 
ascertain the intention of the legislature with respect to the matter at issue." P. 1374. Hart 
and Sacks fill chapter 5 with examples of statutes that fail to serve the public interest because 
they sought to address specific, often private, needs, rather than .to create "general directive 
arrangements." For example, Problem No. 35 ("Provision of Government Services and Pecu-
niary Inducements: The Uses of Insurance, Especially Against Floods") and Problem No. 36 
("A Special Law Dealing With a Municipal Disaster") are textbook examples of what would 
later be understood as "rent-seeking" legislation. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, 
supra note 12, at 288; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS 
OF CONSENT 233-48 (1962) (on rent-seeking in public choice). Eskridge and Frickey suggest 
that Hart and Sacks may not have realized the pessimistic implications of their picture of 
legislative failure. See pp. cxxi-cxxii; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Legislation Scholarship and Ped(lgogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691, 
705-07 (1987) (Richard Posner's "legisprudence" corrected Hart and Sacks's naive views of 
legislation). 
93. Hart and Sacks implicitly criticize the apparent distinction between the adjudication 
of common law and statutes in chapter 1 when they discuss their general principle of law -
the reasoned elaboration of general directive arrangements - without distinguishing be-
tween statutes and common law. See pp. 147-48. Their sense th.at statutory interpretation 
should mainly focus on the search for principle explains, for example, their rejection of the 
"literal approach," and their skepticism of the utility of legislative history. See pp. 1116-48, 
1212-54. Hart and Sacks clearly reflect the influence of Edward Levi in this view. Levi was 
as skeptical about the apparent distinction between statutory interpretation and common law 
interpretation as Hart and Sacks. See, e.g., EDWARD H .. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 29-30 (1949). Levi, however, urged a theory of statutory interpretation that was 
more deferential to early judicial interpretations of legislative intent than the view adopted 
by The Legal Process. Compare LEVI, supra, at 31-32 (in trying to construct legislative intent, 
a court has "more discretion than it has with case law," and for that reason must be more 
deferential to precedent) with p. 1343 (commenting on Levi's theory). 
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CONCLUSION 
The idea that The Legal Process is an argument for the superior-
ity of Fuller's conception of adjudication helps to explain the de-
cline of legal process during the 1960s and 1970s.94 Paradoxically, 
Hart and Sacks's willingness to locate legal decisionmaking beyond 
the courtroom was accompanied by an extraordinarily demanding 
set of criteria for the form of legal decisionmaking. By allowing 
that not all legal actors had to be judges, but then criticizing their 
results when they did not act like judges, Hart and Sacks really took 
away with one hand what they gave with the other. It is likely that 
Hart and Sacks thought that by defining adjudication according to 
Fuller's rigorous criteria they were increasing the stature of 
America's newer nonjudicial adjudicators, and yet what they may 
have done unwittingly was exactly the opposite. By narrowing the 
range of problems that both courts and nonjudicial actors such as 
agencies could solve through adjudication, they may actually have 
provided the premise upon which critics from the left and the right 
built the argument that American public law was unprincipled. 
As I suggested in Section One, our task as readers of The Legal 
Process is to help complete Hart and Sacks's unfinished text. I offer 
a reading that takes seriously the idea that their materials reflect a 
coherent jurisprudential theory. My reading insists on treating The 
Legal Process as a coherent text and uses its structure to indicate 
the content of Hart and Sacks's argument. 
My structural reading of The Legal Process suggests certain con-
sequences. First, my reading is not entirely compatible with the 
three traditional approaches to legal process described in Section 
One. The particular conception of adjudication that I locate at the 
core of the book is not primarily motivated by a theory of institu-
tional competence, since it reflects a method available to a variety 
of social actors. Furthermore, Hart and Sacks's conception of adju-
dication is not primarily a theory of statutory interpretation, since it 
is as much (if not more) a theory of common law interpretation. 
Finally, although Hart and Sacks see rationality as a component of 
their conception of adjudication, rationality underdetermines adju-
dication, since Hart and Sacks demand that adjudication take place 
within certain artificial and highly specific conditions.95 
94. As Eskridge and Frickey note, during the very same period that the legal process 
generation "w[as] exercising power" in society, The Legal Process was losing influence in the 
academy. Pp. cxviii. See also Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 669 (noting the 
tendency for academic critics to dismiss The Legal Process as "an anachronism"). 
95. Hart and Sacks's conception of adjudication may bear the same relationship to ration-
ality that classical common law's concept of "artificial reason" bore to natural reason. See 
GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND TiiE COMMON LAW TRADmON 30-31 (1986). 
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Second, it is important to ask some hard questions about the 
degree to which Hart and Sacks were wedded to Fuller's theory of 
law. While it is clear that they embraced Fuller's conception of ad-
judication, it is not obvious that the theory of law developed in 
Chapter One of The Legal Process can be reconciled with major 
elements of Fuller's legal philosophy. Tue "principle of institu-
tional settlement," which states that a decision is "in some sense 
'right' simply because it has been duly made" (p. 109), seems to 
have more in common with legal positivism than Fuller's own ver-
sion of natural law.96 This raises the possibility that, even as a com-
pleted work of theory, The Legal Process fails the test of coherence. 
Third, I cannot ignore the fact that any structural reading of The 
Legal Process can be no more than an act of virtual reconstruction, 
since not all the pieces that are missing from this artifact ever ex-
isted. We will never know what the two unwritten chapters of The 
Legal Process would have said, what cases they would have dis-
cussed, and how they would have affected the structural reading 
that produced the specific conception of adjudication proposed in 
this essay.97 These problems cannot be wished away, and they are 
the inevitable consequence of engaging Hart and Sacks on their 
own terms, as the architects of a theory of adjudication that they 
believed could both explain and shape the institution of law in mod-
em America. -
96. See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 12, at 1014-15 (describing legal process 
as positivist); Sebok, supra note 22, at 2105 (same). Fuller's natural law theory was modest 
and carefully designed to avoid the mistakes of other more extreme views. See SUMMERS, 
supra note 36, at 61. Nonetheless, Fuller seemed to believe in a coincidence between ration-
ality and morality that suggests a thicker theory of process than Hart and Sacks's: "[the 
positivist] seems to assume that evil aims may have as much coherence and inner logic as 
good ones. I, for one, refuse to accept that assumption." Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity 
to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958). I explore the 
relationship between Fuller and legal process in ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL PoslTIVISM AND 
nm GRowra OF AMERICAN JurusPRUDENCE (forthcoming Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). 
97. A further, and less optimistic question raised by the missing chapters is whether the 
chapter on constitutional law (what was to have been chapter 8) was never written because it 
could not be written. That is, did Hart and Sacks find that their conception of adjudication, 
which seemed to provide satisfactory explanations of the making and interpretation of com-
mon law and statutes, simply could not make sense of the polycentric, prospective, and inher-
ently political problems of constitutional law? See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 37, at 1290. 
